Part of memoirs of martyr Seyed Asadollah Lajevardi
Boycotting within prison
Selected by: Faezeh Sassanikhah
Translated by: M.B. Khoshnevisan
2025-3-17
Here I remember something that breaks the continuity, and I have to say it because I may forget it later. In Evin Prison, due to the special position that we and our brothers held and our belief in following the line of Marja’eiyat [sources of emulation] and the Imam, we had many differences with the Mujahedin.[1] On all issues, from ideological matters to minor details, and even on tactical matters, we had significant disagreements. They considered many actions permissible to achieve their goals that were completely forbidden from our perspective and in Islam.
We had a strong and unwavering stance, especially against Marxism. In our view, Marxists were also bound to the fate of Marxism. We, who rejected both Marxism and Marxists, were boycotted by the Mujahedin. In prison, we were completely isolated; they neither spoke to us nor allowed others under their influence to communicate with us. They feared that contact with us would influence their thoughts negatively and cloud their revolutionary vision. Thus, they actively avoided any interaction with us. This boycott prevented anyone from approaching us, as they were afraid of the consequences. If someone dared to contact us, they would face severe punishment. They were instructed to clarify their position - either be with us and avoid contact with them, or vice versa.
This situation was designed to keep the newcomers in prison under their control. If they had the chance to contact us directly, they might have sought our opinions on certain matters to resolve conflicts or prevent any revelations outside the prison. They were always looking for an opportunity to engage with us.[2]
[1] Habibollah Asgarowladi: The three of us, Mr. Lajevardi, Mr. Haj Heidari, and I, decided to invite 12 leaders of the MKO who were in Mashhad Prison and present an ultimatum to them. Martyr Lajevardi believed that engaging in further arguments was unnecessary, as he knew these individuals were closed-minded and resistant to others' perspectives. Over 20 nights, we had discussions with about 10-12 of their leaders. These meetings were the final arguments with some of the leaders of the People’s Mujahedin. When they were supposed to respond, they delayed until the next morning. Mr. Lajevardi was convinced that their response was evident. The following morning, they labeled us as the number one counter-revolutionaries. Martyr Lajevardi mentioned that it was clear to him they would not change, despite our efforts. (Shahed Yaran, Martyr Seyyed Asadollah Lajevardi, p. 6)
[2] Source: Eslami, Javad, The Struggle Based on the Narration of Martyr Seyyed Asadollah Lajevardi, Iranian Press Cultural Institute, Iran Publications, 1401 (2022), Tehran, p. 157.
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As Operation Fath-ol-Mobin came to an end, the commanders gathered at the “Montazeran-e Shahadat” Base, thrilled by a huge and, to some extent, astonishing victory achieved in such a short time. They were already bracing themselves for the next battle. It is no exaggeration to say that this operation solidified an unprecedented friendship between the Army and IRGC commanders.A Selection from the Memoirs of Haj Hossein Yekta
The scorching cold breeze of the midnight made its way under my wet clothes and I shivered. The artillery fire did not stop. Ali Donyadideh and Hassan Moghimi were in front. The rest were behind us. So ruthlessly that it was as if we were on our own soil. Before we had even settled in at the three-way intersection of the Faw-Basra-Umm al-Qasr road, an Iraqi jeep appeared in front of us.Boycotting within prison
Here I remember something that breaks the continuity, and I have to say it because I may forget it later. In Evin Prison, due to the special position that we and our brothers held and our belief in following the line of Marja’eiyat [sources of emulation] and the Imam, we had many differences with the Mujahedin.
