Third Regiment: Memoirs of an Iraqi Prisoner of War Doctor – 27

By Mojtaba al-Hosseini
Translated into Farsi by: Mohammad Hossein Zavar Kabeh
Translated into English by: M.B. Khoshnevisan

2026-4-26

Third Regiment: Memoirs of an Iraqi Prisoner of War Doctor – 27

By Mojtaba al-Hosseini

Translated into Farsi by: Mohammad Hossein Zavar Kabeh

Translated into English by: M.B. Khoshnevisan

***

Of course. Here is the translation from Persian to American English, rendered in a formal, analytical tone suitable for a historical or political context.

***

On March 29, 1981, Banisadr once again tested his military plan through a military operation, but this time too, he achieved no success. The operation area was located near the village of “Kooheh.” That day, the concentration of water between our embankments and those of the Iranians had created a barrier separating the two sides’ forces. Engineering units were measuring the volume of water in the prohibited zone[1], which was increasing day and night. Although the Iranian forces used all their capabilities to drown our forces in the water, the engineering units managed to construct sturdy earthen dams using motorized equipment. The responsibility of maintaining these dams fell to the armed forces. Before the start of the military operation, the Iranian forces raised the water level in the prohibited zone to its highest point, and two days later, they launched a swift operation—on one hand to break the earthen dams and send water flowing toward our forces, and on the other hand to force them to retreat. In theory, this operation was highly effective in pushing back Iraqi forces from the city of Ahvaz, keeping the city out of the range of heavy artillery, and preventing the Iraqis from advancing toward Ahvaz. In practice, however, it took a different turn. The Iranians, who intended to attack the sturdy earthen dams protected by trained and equipped forces, would have needed to use advanced military capabilities and experienced personnel so that by destroying the dams at multiple points, they could send water rushing with full force toward the Iraqi forces. Now let us see what the Iranian forces actually did. At midnight on March 29, 1981, they began shelling the positions of the 20th Brigade’s forces using heavy artillery, mortars, and Katyusha rockets. During this bombardment, the positions of the first and third Battalions came under heavy fire. The Iranians used 203mm heavy artillery to crush our positions. Because of this intense shelling, the personnel of the first Battalion took cover in their positions, and the attacking forces were easily able to reach our embankment using small plastic boats. These forces consisted of a naval Special Forces battalion.

When the Iranian forces seized the earthen dam, the tanks retreated for fear of being hit by RPG rounds. The Iranians intended to use TNT to blow up the earthen dam at several points, but the assault by our forces, supported by tank fire, denied the flustered Iranian forces enough time and prevented the earthen dam from being completely destroyed by the attacking forces. As a result, those forces fled using their small boats, leaving behind four dead and one prisoner.

During this offensive operation, only one point of the dam suffered minor damage, which was immediately repaired by engineering forces, preventing any water leakage. In this confrontation, two members of the Jaysh al-Sha'bi (People's Army) were also killed and seven others wounded. The factors involved in the failure of this operation are as follows:

Failure to use experienced and suitable forces for the attack, and relying on only 250 men who all launched the assault from a single axis. To blow up the earthen dam, the operation should have been carried out at several distant points simultaneously so that our forces could not quickly repair them. The Iranian artillery unit did not provide support for their forces after they were positioned on the earthen dam, whereas intense artillery bombardment should have continued against our forces behind the dam so that the Iraqis would be unable to respond. Additionally, a sufficient force should have been designated to keep the Iraqis occupied, so that the Iranian forces could properly blow up the dam from several points. During the interrogation of the captured Iranian soldier, it was revealed that Banisadr personally supervised the execution of the operation. This failure, added to Banisadr’s previous defeats, further weakened his political position.

The intensification of political and military disputes regarding the handling of the war, coupled with military defeats at the front, had a negative impact on Banisadr’s position and his supporting political faction. This issue further exacerbated the differences between him and the faction loyal to Ayatollah Khomeini. Eventually, due to the chaos in the military situation and the mismanagement of the battlefield, Imam Khomeini issued an order dismissing Banisadr from his position as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces.

As usual, I was tasked with dispatching a mobile medical unit to Headquarters 'P' of the 20th Brigade. At that time, the 20th Brigade had been relocated from the southeast to the southwest of Ahvaz, west of the strategic Ahvaz-Khorramshahr road, and was stationed at the former position of the armored brigade forces belonging to the ninth Division. Our axis extended from west of the Ahvaz-Khorramshahr road and the village of 'Kooheh' to the east of the village of 'Ahmadabad,' located on the banks of the Karkheh Koor River.

I set out from the brigade headquarters toward the 20th Brigade headquarters in a jeep. First, we traveled along the road from Hamid Garrison to Susangerd, and after covering eight kilometers through the desert, we changed direction eastward and drove onto an unpaved desert road. Surrounding this road were several small villages, and a number of Khuzestani families lived in some of its mud-brick houses.

About one kilometer from the brigade headquarters, we passed by a small, insignificant village that contained a tiny shrine named "Mausoleum of Seyyed Khalaf." Upon seeing slogans supporting the Ba'athists on the walls of the Khuzestani homes and the presence of several Jaysh al-Sha'bi vehicles stationed beside the houses, I felt that they were cooperating with our forces.

We left the village behind and headed north, and after a while, we arrived at the positions of Headquarters 'P' of the 20th Brigade. Sturdy bunkers had been built next to each other, surrounded by numerous embankments. Two bunkers for the mobile medical unit were located in the center of the brigade headquarters, next to the bunkers of the brigade's commanding officers. One of these small yet sturdy bunkers was designated for the doctor, and in the larger bunker, medicines and medical equipment were stored, where the medical deputy and the ambulance driver rested. That same evening, I made my way behind the bunker and looked through binoculars at the front lines of our forces, which were positioned opposite the village of 'Kooheh.' These forces were scattered across a vast plain, located several kilometers away from our headquarters. The overall atmosphere of the front was relatively calm, except for sporadic shelling. According to the commander, our brigade headquarters was secure.

The creation of a barrier between the two sides' forces by the large volume of water, the Iranian forces' focus on reorganization, and the paralysis of their capabilities due to internal political conflicts in Tehran meant that no military engagement took place in the region. Colonel Staff Abdul-Mone’m Sulaiman, the brigade commander at that time, warmly welcomed me. We exchanged some conversation, and when he found out that I was a graduate of the University of Mosul, he was very pleased, because he himself was from Mosul and his brother practiced medicine there as an eye doctor. The next day, as we sat around the dining table, the brigade commander said to me: "You are in charge of the medical unit, and you have full authority to take any action you deem appropriate in this field."

His words served as a military order for the officers present at that meeting.  

The next day, I began inspecting the soldiers' positions and gave them advice regarding health and hygiene matters. The overall hygiene situation was very poor due to the accumulation of trash and waste in the bunkers and the lack of field sanitation units. However, after the recommendations were made, the area was cleaned, and several field sanitation units were also established.

Even though spring had arrived, the temperature in that region of Khuzestan was very high. I was forced to sleep outside the bunker, but the mosquitoes and the sound of intermittent shelling from our artillery—which fired day and night, especially at night, against Iranian positions—deprived us of any comfort. Interestingly, the Iraqis had named these nighttime artillery barrages "night harassment," which naturally carried the same meaning for us. After a week had passed, the sound of a particular cannon, which was apparently different from the others, caught my attention. I asked an officer about this powerful sound. He replied: "That sound belongs to a heavy 180mm cannon, recently purchased from Russia, with a range of about 45 kilometers."

I told him: "What is the use of this cannon?"

He said: "This cannon, which is fired under the supervision of one captain and twelve non-commissioned officers, can easily target the city of Ahvaz." He added that they usually increase the charge to achieve its maximum range. This cannon fired several shells intermittently during the day and especially at night. With my own eyes, I could see the flash of explosions within the city. One day, I asked the operations officer about the characteristics of this cannon and the purpose of shelling a city where Iranian army personnel were not present. He replied: "The order to shell comes from Baghdad—that is, from the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. The objective is to empty the city of its inhabitants, so that on one hand, the economic activity of Ahvaz is paralyzed, and on the other hand, the support process for Iranian combat forces at the front is weakened, because this city plays a vital role in providing aid to Iranian combatants."

I told him: "Most of the residents of this city are Arabs, our brothers. We stepped into the field to defend them."

He said: "That doesn't matter. What matters is that we win the war, even if all the Arabs of Saudi Arabia[2] are killed in the process!"

I was astonished by this Ba'athist way of thinking. They adhered to the principle that "the end justifies the means"—an idea devoid of any human and moral values. For the sake of achieving the evil goals and malicious intentions of America and Israel, they were slaughtering innocent and defenseless people.

To be continued …