An Excerpt from the Memoirs of Reza Amir Sardari

Monafeghin: A New Deception

July-August 1989

Selected by Faezeh Sasanikhah
Translated by Kianoush Borzouei

2025-08-11

Following the discussions around the asylum of Iraqi prisoners of war in Iran during peace negotiations, the Iraqi side, not wanting to fall behind, launched their own campaign to offer asylum. At the outset, they attempted to attract prisoners by making grand promises—freedom, release from the camps, life in Iraqi cities, and full access to welfare amenities, including housing and more. What they failed to grasp, however, was that even setting aside the deep patriotism and familial loyalty of the prisoners, the brutal conduct of the guards during captivity had erased any potential sentimentality. On the contrary, it had instilled in the captives a deeply negative perception of Iraq and Iraqis.

Ultimately, Iraq’s efforts managed to win over only a tiny handful of individuals—mainly those of fragile constitution—who lacked the resolve to resist the Iraqis’ persistent demands and feared the consequences of returning to Iran, having behaved dishonorably during their imprisonment. Among these few were sympathizers of the Mojahedin-e Khalq (MEK/Monafeghin), who saw asylum in Iraq as a pathway to joining their ideological comrades.

Faced with such a meager response, the Ba’athist operatives escalated their efforts to persuade others. To lure more defectors, they offered temporary privileges to those who declared asylum: better meals, increased bread rations, cigarettes, unrestricted access to showers and restrooms, exemption from group punishments, and so forth. But once it became clear that their broader recruitment campaign had failed, even these limited perks were withdrawn. The reality that only ten or twelve individuals out of a camp of 3,500 had opted for asylum was a source of embarrassment. Moreover, their promises proved hollow. The committed Basiji prisoners and others took advantage of the situation, ultimately convincing even some of those initial defectors to revoke their asylum.

When the Iraqis realized their asylum campaign had failed, they turned to the Monafeghin for help. The MEK, having lost the bulk of their combat forces in the Eternal Light operation, were in urgent need of manpower and readily welcomed Saddam’s request for assistance. Thus, for the first time in July-August 1989, a group of Monafeghin operatives—led by“Abrishamchi”—was dispatched to the camp to recruit new members. Haunted by previous encounters with Iranian POWs, the Monafeghin dared not enter the camp. Instead, they stationed themselves at a command post just outside its perimeter, sending word inside: “We have come to rescue you!” As usual, their recruitment drive relied on a tapestry of fabrications. Knowing well the disgracegul conditions in the camp, they promised false luxuries—nutritious food, clean clothing, leisure facilities, unrestricted urban mobility, decent healthcare, and more.

Initially, the names of a few prisoners—again, mostly those of weak resolve—were collected. These individuals were brought together in a designated dormitory. A Monafeghin representative arrived in the evening, once the rest of the camp had returned to their quarters, and gave a speech to the group. In an effort to entice others, the group was kept together for several days in relative isolation, receiving direct attention from the Monafeghin. Yet, contrary to the conspirators' expectations, no new recruits emerged. On the contrary, several individuals—thanks to the warnings and discreet messages sent by fellow prisoners—were persuaded to withdraw from the scheme. During this period, the defectors had separate recreation and rest hours, but that didn’t stop the rest of the camp from finding ways to reach them. Many pretended to be sick in order to access the infirmary, which provided opportunities to smuggle messages to the would-be defectors and dissuade them from further entanglement.^[1]

 
Number of Visits: 43

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