A Portion of Abbas Douzduzani’s Memoirs

From Revolutionary Circles to the Military Arm of the Islamic Government

Selected by Faezeh Sasanikhah
Translated by Kianoush Borzouei

2026-05-12

In those days, it became clear that certain institutions had to be established very quickly—institutions suited to the temperament, expectations, and lingering aspirations of the younger generation; young people who had been politically active before the Revolution and, in some cases, had been directly entangled in arrests, imprisonment, and torture at the hands of the regime, SAVAK, the anti-sabotage forces, the city police intelligence apparatus, and other security organs. Having grasped the realities and critical junctures of Iran at the time, these youths understood that a capable and decent popular force had to emerge to safeguard the centrality and values of the Revolution. This popular force was, in essence, the military wing that was to defend the Revolution and the prevailing values of Iranian society in political and intelligence domains.

If we narrow the circle of revolutionaries a little further, there was a group that had assumed leadership of the movement and various fighting organizations. They may even have considered themselves natural leaders. There was also another group that had been present in the uprisings, had confronted the previous regime, and had been imprisoned during that period. These individuals had various records of struggle against the regime, and naturally each group had, in one way or another, developed certain inclinations in its mind. Moreover, by that time the army had been disintegrated and could no longer function. For those seeking to impose order on the situation, it seemed necessary to prepare a force that could, when required, enter the scene and act as a committed military arm. Accordingly, the building of Refah School was chosen as the initial center for this cohesion. On the night it was announced that the Revolution had triumphed, we immediately went to Refah School.

The formation of this unhatched military institution attracted the attention of several factions. On one side, the Provisional Government was pursuing such a course, arguing that money and weapons were in the government’s hands and that this group should be supplied through that channel. On another side were the pre-revolutionary prisoners, who harbored aspirations for the realization of Islamic rule and believed that, having been engaged in the country’s political and revolutionary affairs for years, they had a rightful claim to participation in the formation of such an institution. There were also exile groups outside the country who had left Iran and were often connected to elements inside the country, such as the late martyr Sheikh Mohammad Montazeri who, together with distinguished figures like the martyred Mousa Namjou and the martyred Yousef Kolahdooz, had formed an organization. Another faction consisted of ideological and Islamic groups, including seven groups that later founded the Organization of the Mojahedin of the Islamic Revolution. Each of the four principal factions appointed three representatives to the central core for the formation of the Sepah, and ultimately a twelve-member group took shape.

At that time, of course, Imam had not yet issued a clear directive for the formation of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps; nonetheless, this nucleus was in contact with Imam and in complete obedience to his views. We believed then that Imam was entirely in favor of establishing such an institution as early as possible so that affairs would remain at the heart of the Revolution. Owing to prior relations between members of this group and the Revolutionary Council, individuals from that council were also added to the twelve-member body, including Mr. Mousa Ardabili and Mr. Hashemi Rafsanjani.

The three individuals representing the Provisional Government on this council were Haj Mohsen Rafighdoost, Mr. Ali Mohammad Basharati, and Mr. Ali Danesh-Monfared. Occasionally, some members attended in place of others; for example, Dr. Jalil Zarrabi would sometimes attend instead of one of the three government representatives. Among the council members, those representing the Provisional Government held firmer positions than the others and maintained that the government possessed the authority and means. Representing those who had spent years in prison were Abu Sharif, Javad Mansouri, myself, and at times Mr. Ebrahim Haji-Mohammadzadeh. From the group of the martyred Mohammad Montazeri were the martyred Mohammad Montazeri, the martyred Namjou, and the martyred Kolahdooz, all of whom were later martyred. From the groups that formed the Organization of the Mojahedin of the Islamic Revolution were also the martyred Mohammad Boroujerdi and Mohsen Rezaei. The third representative of this group was sometimes Mr. Morteza Alviri and sometimes Mr. Mohsen Sazgara. These twelve individuals were essentially the permanent members of the council, and we had in fact grown quite close. This twelve-member core was ultimately linked to a member of the General Council, who at that time was Mr. Mousavi Ardabili.

Meetings were usually held in the alley of Jamshidieh Barracks, where the homes of some army generals were located. At times they were also held in the Kia building, which had once been the headquarters of the Mojahedin-e Khalq Organization. With the representative of the Revolutionary Council present, this twelve-member group became thirteen. Until the middle of April 1979, the meetings continued according to whatever schedule the circumstances required. Then, after the midst of April (the end of Farvardin), it was decided that three individuals should be selected from among the twelve to travel to Qom and obtain from Imam the order for the establishment of the Sepah.

In the end, Mohsen Rafighdoost, Mohsen Rezaei, and I went to see Imam. That evening he was busy, so we stayed overnight at one of the gentlemen’s homes in Qom and met Imam early the next morning. In the session with him, after greetings, pleasantries and paying respect, the matter of establishing the Sepah arose. It seemed that he had already been fully informed and knew precisely what process had unfolded and where matters stood. That day I was seated next to Imam, while “the two Mohsens” sat opposite him. There I explained to him that our friends had concluded we should inform you that the Provisional Government and Dr. Ebrahim Yazdi, the Minister of State for Revolutionary Affairs, believed—and insisted—that this institution should be formed by the government as an instrument in its own hands. As soon as I raised this point, Imam categorically objected and said: “You yourselves go and establish the Sepah.”

We regarded this very sentence as Imam’s command and took leave of his presence. Upon returning to Tehran, on the first day of Ordibehesht 1358 (April 1979), we drafted a statement whose text had been entrusted to me, and submitted it to the newspapers; it was published the following day. That statement effectively constituted the first public announcement of the existence of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.

In essence, there was no written order for the establishment of the Sepah. Imam issued a verbal directive for its formation, and on the 22nd day of April 1979 the Sepah began operating under my management. Its establishment was reported only in the newspaper Ettelaat. The other newspapers either followed the counterrevolution or Bani-Sadr. The Sepah’s initial task was to collect weapons that were in the hands of the public and distribute them among its trained personnel, and then to train individuals so that, at least in the areas of intelligence, guardianship, watchfulness, and protection, they could carry out the necessary duties.

Meanwhile, Mr. Lahouti, within the Sepah formed by the Provisional Government, had been appointed by Imam to represent and supervise its affairs. Yet both Imam and Mr. Lahouti himself, and all of us, knew that forming the Sepah was not something the Provisional Government was meant to do. Rather, this organization was to be a popular institution, and all those interested in such responsibilities were to be its custodians. In the end, that is precisely what happened. Eventually, groups such as Mohammad Montazeri’s and Mr. Lahouti’s, along with others, agreed to cooperate with this institution. The martyred Montazeri had been part of the same twelve-member nucleus with us.

At the outset, the first organization and consolidation of the forces began at Refah School. They included members of the Melal Groups Party as well as members of other groups. The members of the Melal Party at that time were all adults, each around forty or close to it. This school had several distinctive features; in addition to serving as a weapons depot, it also held important prisoners. It was also at this center that the training of forces began. Initially, we conducted two-week training courses. applicants for membership in the Sepah attended a lecture that instilled motivation and renewed purpose in them, after which they entered a training program comprising theoretical instruction and political ideology. Individuals were trained separately at night, alongside military instruction. Those who joined the Sepah came from all backgrounds and professions; even physicians and dentists volunteered. They underwent training for two weeks and were then assigned to appropriate posts according to their capabilities.

As the activities of this newly established institution continued, it was decided that a six-month temporary commander should be appointed for the Sepah. Our intention was to choose Mr. Javad Mansouri for this role, because he was familiar with prison life and we all held special respect for him. He was selected for six months. After that period, the responsibility was entrusted to me and I accepted it as a religious duty.^[1]

 

 
Number of Visits: 10

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