The Reason for Concealing the Names of the Members of the Revolutionary Council
Translated by Kianoush Borzouei
2025-5-14
Prior to the victory of the revolution on February 11, 1979, it had been firmly decided that the identities of the members of the Revolutionary Council would remain undisclosed. This measure was taken to ensure their safety, as revealing their names would have undoubtedly exposed them to enemy threats, making it easy for adversaries to eliminate them from the revolutionary struggle. In fact, during the early days of the month of Muharram, the Shah’s regime, having sensed the pivotal role of the combatant clergy, arrested a few clerics whom it believed to be playing leading roles. I, along with approximately six other associates, was detained for a few days and taken to Evin Prison and subsequently to the Komiteh. We were confident, however, that our arrest would not decelerate the movement; rather, it would accelerate it. Therefore, we firmly declared at that time that even if you arrest a thousand of us, the movement will not only persist but will gain momentum. And if you destroy us, you will achieve nothing—because, fortunately, the movement has become a nationwide phenomenon. Thus, the names of the Revolutionary Council members remained confidential, and even after the revolution's victory, their identities continued to be withheld for some time. This decision was driven by several considerations. First, the magnitude and complexity of national responsibilities in the post-revolutionary period were so overwhelming that these individuals could not afford to be surrounded by public inquiries and demands. Furthermore, they needed sufficient time and space to reflect, offer consultative insights, devise strategic plans, hold meetings, and identify capable individuals for various roles. Another reason for the secrecy was that some members had been appointed to the Council due to their professional expertise, not necessarily because of ideological alignment with the revolutionary movement. I state this candidly that not all individuals within the Council were genuine revolutionaries who had fully internalized the spirit of the revolution or were in harmony with it. Publicly announcing their names as members of the Revolutionary Council would have conferred upon them an undue and unjustified social status. From our perspective, we did not know of any other individuals with equivalent technocratic qualifications who were also truly revolutionary in character. Despite extensive inquiries, no such alternatives were introduced to us. Even those who had met Imam Khomeini in various capacities during his time in Paris were unable to present figures who combined both technical competence and revolutionary commitment. Otherwise, had such individuals existed and been presented to the Imam, he would have instructed us accordingly and we would have followed his direction.[1]
[1] Source: Enduring Memories: The Life of Ayatollah Dr. Seyyed Mohammad Hossein Beheshti, compiled by Morteza Nazari, Tehran: Office for the Publication of Islamic Culture, 1st edition, 1999, pp. 206–207.
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